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BOOLEAN VALUED MODELS 
AND INCOMPLETE SPECIFICATIONS* 
BERND I. DAHN 
D For each consistent universal first order theory 7 a Boolean valued model of 7 
is constructed that satisfies an existential sentence if and only if it is provable 
from 7. The resolution calculus is extended so that proofs from 7 yield 
representations of objects incompletely specified by .7 in a Boolean valued 
model. a 
INTRODUCTION 
Logic programming has favored universal Horn theories for several reasons. An 
advantage of consistent universal Horn theories, compared with arbitrary consistent 
theories, is the fact that they possess a “typical” model-the least Herbrand model. 
More precisely, in order to verify that a sentence of the form 3 X, . . . 3 x, A, where A 
is a conjunction of atomic formulas (i.e. positive literals), is a consequence of a 
universal Horn theory .7, it suffices to prove that this sentence holds in the least 
Herbrand model of 7. 
Moreover, this distinguished model of 7 can be characterized algebraically as the 
initial object in the category of all models of 7 which has homomorphisms as 
morphisms. 
It is the aim of this paper to show that every consistent universal theory has a 
Boolean valued model with similar properties. This model will be described, and its 
principal properties will be discussed. 
Boolean valued models provide a natural tool for modeling incompletely specified 
objects, such as those arising from resolution proofs of existential formulas from 
non-Horn theories. Green’s procedure [6] for extracting such specifications from proofs 
is refined to yield a complete specification of an object in a Boolean valued model. 
*This paper is a revised version of [3]; the revision consists mainly in a more detailed presentation of the 
mathematical concepts. The reader interested in a still more comprehensive discussion of the mathematical 
details is referred to [2]. In the last part the modification of linear resolution has been replaced by a 
modification of full resolution. 
THE JOURNAL OF LOGIC PROGRAMMING 
OElsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc., 1992 
655 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10010 0743.1066/92/$3.50 
226 BERND I. DAHN 
Throughout the paper we fix some countable signature u having at least one constant 
symbol and a consistent universal theory Y of signature 0. Then af denotes the 
signature obtained from u by deleting all relational symbols. For each set U, a(U) 
denotes the signature obtained from U by adding a constant for each element of U. 
These constants are interpreted in a canonical way whenever this is possible. Unless 
stated otherwise, all formulas are assumed to be first order formulas without identity, 
i.e., we do not assume that u 
be interpreted as identity. 
BOOLEAN VALUED MODELS 
A Boolean algebra % is said 
8 has a least upper bound 
contains a special binary relation symbol = which has to 
to be complete if every nonempty set X of elements of 
sup(X) in ‘$3 [and hence also a greatest lower bound 
inf( X)]. We put sup(@) = 0 and inf( 0) = 1, and mention that in any complete 
Boolean algebra ‘8 = (B,O, 1, n, U, -) 
ynsup(X) =sup({yflx: XEX}) and yUinf(X) =inf({yUx: XEX}) 
(see [9] for the required results on complete Boolean algebras). The natural partial 
ordering in Boolean algebras will be denoted by I . If an ambiguity could arise, we 
shall explicitly mention the structure from which we use the partial ordering. 
A Boolean valued structure ‘8 = (91,, 23, [ 1) of signature u with universe U 
consists of an interpretation tiI, of uf with underlying set U, a complete Boolean 
algebra 8 and a map [ ] assigning to each atomic sentence A of signature u(U) an 
element [ A] of 9. Since 8 is complete, the map [ ] can be extended in a canonical 
way to all sentences of the signature u(U), putting in particular 
[=A@)] = sup({[ A(u)] : =U}), 
[vxA(x)] =inf({[A(u)]:u~U}). 
A is said to hold in % (‘3 E A) if [A] = 1. 
A natural way to construct a Boolean valued model of ? is as follows. Let ‘?3a 
denote the Lindenbaum algebra of all quantifier free sentences of Y, i.e. the universe of 
8 0 consists of all equivalence classes of quantifier free sentences of signature u modulo 
Y. It is well known (see [7]) that each Boolean algebra 8 has a unique (up to 
isomorphism) extension to a complete Boolean algebra which is minimal among all 
complete Boolean algebras extending 23. Let 8 * be a completion of 9 ,,. By tiI, we 
denote the Herbrand interpretation of a-. Taking for each atomic sentence A it’s 
equivalence class modulo .Y- as [ A], we obtain a Boolean valued structure (?I[,, B *, 
[ I), which is easily seen to be a model of Y. However, the following example shows 
that this Boolean valued structure will in general satisfy more existential formulas than 
Y can prove. 
Example. Consider a signature consisting of a single unary relation symbol r 
and countably many constants c,. As the theory Y we consider the empty set. 
The Lindenbaum algebra of the quantifier free sentences will be isomorphic to the 
Lindenbaum algebra of propositional logic. If the class of A in the latter algebra is 
an upper bound for all the classes of propositional variables, then A will be a tautol- 
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ogy. By isomorphy we get that in the completion of the Lindenbaum algebra mod f 
sup{ [ r(cJ] : EM} = 1. 
Therefore, if we interpret the existential quantifier by the 
However 3 XT(X) is not derivable from the empty theory. 
A CANONICAL BOOLEAN VALUED HERBBAND MODEL 
supremum, [3 xT( x)] = 1. 
In order to describe a Boolean valued structure satisfying exactly the existential 
sentences provable from ?, we need some topological concepts. 
For a set X in a topological space, int( X) and cl(X) denote the interior and the 
closure of X respectively. Such a set X is said to be regular open if X = int(cl( X)). 
From [9, Theorem 2.61, we know the following 
Lemma I. For every topological space X, the set of all regular open sets of 9” is a 
complete Boolean algebra 9l (X) with 0 = 0, 1 = F, and with intersection *, 
union + , and complement - defined by X* Y = Xn Y, X + Y = int(cl( X U 
Y)), - X = int(cl( Xix)) respectively. 
We observe that by definition of the intersection, the partial ordering of a Boolean 
algebra of regular open sets coincides with set inclusion. Nevertheless, inf and sup can 
be different from set theoretic intersection and union. For example, in the algebra of 
regular open sets of the real line with the usual topology, the infimum of the set of all 
open intervals containing 0 is the empty set, while the set theoretic intersection is (0). 
Let HMod(f) be the set of all Herbrand models of J7. For each sentence A let @A 
denote the set of all Herbrand models of r U { A}. The sets 4PA where A is a 
universal sentence generate a topology on HMod(f) making up a topological space 
&5&?!(7 ). 
Lemma 2. For every universal sentence A the set @A is closed and open (clopen 
for short) and hence regular open. Moreover, each regular open set V is the 
supremum of all the sets @i, E y. 
PROOF. Let A = v r B( r), where B is quantifier free. Then 
U, = fl { U&) : u is a sequence of ground terms) 
The sets es(“) are obviously clopen; hence @%A is closed. 
Since @A E y implies %, I “t/, we have ?J+ sup{ @!A : %A E “Y}. On the other 
hand, for each ,@E y there must be some “y G v such that !Q)E ^ y G sup{ %A : %A E 
“Y}. Hence $‘= sup{ qA : @i, c “Y). 0 
Now let 3?(y) be the Boolean valued structure { UJS), %(35&~!(S)), [ I), 
where qf(3’) is the Herbrand interpretation of uf, and for each atomic sentence A of 
the signature [A] = @A. Let 8(y) = ?Z(%&Z!(? )). In this model we have 
Lemma 3. [ A] = %A for each universal sentence A. 
PROOF. The assertion is obvious for quantifier free sentences. Let A = V r B(r). Since 
*,4 E %3(u) for each sequence u of ground terms, 4PA E [Vr B(r)]. On the other 
hand, if lj # @, , then h E %sCtj for some f . 
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But @-a(,) fl inf{ 4Yacuj : u is a sequence of ground terms} = 0; hence h cannot belong 
to [VrB(r)], This proves [VrB(r)J C [A]. 0 
Since Y is a universal theory, a consequence of Lemma 3 is 
Theorem 4. .X”(Y-) is a Boolean valued model of .Y. 
Moreover we have 
Theorem 5. For every existential sentence A of signature 0 
X(Y) E A if and only if .Wt= A. 
PROOF. .TI= A if and only if gTA = 0 if and only if [TA] = 0, by Lemma 3. 0 
In particular, if YE A -+ B, where A and B are quantifier free sentences, then 
[A] 5 [B]; hence ~(&Q&!(Y )) contains an isomorphic copy of the Lindenbaum 
algebra of quantifier free sentences modulo Y. 
In the case of propositional logic, where each propositional variable is considered as 
a 0-ary relation symbol, every universal sentence is equivalent to a quantifier free 
sentence. Since every regular open set is the supremum of the sets OPA which it 
contains, 9(Y) is in this case the completion of the Lindenbaum algebra of quantifier 
free sentences of signature 0. 
FORCING WITH UNIVERSAL SENTENCES 
In order to discuss a more complicated example, it is useful to introduce the technique 
of forcing, which is well known from set theory and model theory. Details can be found 
in [7, 9, 21. 
We shall introduce a partially ordered set of so-called forcing conditions. Then we 
shall define, by induction on the structure of the sentence A, what it means to say that a 
forcing condition p forces A. 
From the literature on forcing it is well known that there is a canonical homomor- 
phism from the partial orderings of forcing conditions into the partial orderings of 
nonzero elements of a complete Boolean algebra such that a condition p forces 7 1 A if 
and only if its image under the homomorphism is below the Boolean value of A in an 
appropriate Boolean valued structure. In particular, A has the maximal truth value if 
and only if the maximal forcing condition forces 71 A. We mention that in general 
only the intuitionistically valid sentences are forced by all conditions; in particular, 
p IRA implies p II--- A, but the converse need not be true. 
Let II denote the set of ground terms of signature a. The canonical forcing 
structure of signature (J is the triple U = (U,, 6, IF) such that U, is the Herbrand 
interpretation of signature a; & = (C, I , (ZI), where C is the set of all finite sets p of 
universal sentences such that Y Up is consistent, and I is the partial ordering on C 
such that p 5 q if and only if q up; and It is the relation between elements of C and 
atomic sentences of signature u defined by 
p IkA if and only if A EP. 
The elements of C are called forcing conditions, and p II-A is read “condition p 
forces A ’ ’ 
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The forcing relation is extended to arbitrary sentences of the signature u by the 
following definitions: 
plk-A ifandonlyif forno qlpdoes qll-A, 
p II-A A B if and only if p IIA and p IkB, 
p\kAVB if and only if pIkA or pIkB, 
p IkA -+ B if and only if for each q I p, q IkA implies q I!-B, 
pll-A-B ifandonlyif pll-A+Band pIkB+A, 
p IF3 xA( x) if and only if p IkA( c) for some CE U, 
p II-b’xA( X) if and only if 
for each CE U and q i p there is some r 5 q such that r IkA( c) . 
Definition. A nonempty set G G C of conditions is said to be generic (respectively, 
A-generic) if and only if 
(1) for all p, qeG there is some rcG such that r <p and r I q, 
(2) PEG and p I q implies qEG, 
(3) for all sentences (respectively, for all atomic sentences) A of the signature a(U) 
there is some PEG such that p II-A or p It- A. 
For each (A-)generic set G let Uo denote the Herbrand interpolation which is such 
that for each atomic formula A of the signature u , UG k-A if and only if some p E G 
forces A. The structures UG are called the (A-) generic structures of U . Note that our 
concept of a generic structure is similar to the one used in set theory but is different 
from the notion of a generic model used by Makowsky in [8]. 
Theorem 6. For each p EC the set of A-generic structures U, for p)~ G is exactly 
the set of all Herbrand models of YU p. 
Corollary 7. For each p E C and for each quantifier free sentence A of the signature 
a, 
pI-~~A ifandonlyif .7Up1-A. 
Lemma 8. If G is (A-)generic, then for all (quantifier free) sentences A of the 
signature u, U, != A if and only if there is some PEG such that p IkA. 
Lemma 9. For each APE C and each (universal) sentence A of the signature u, 
p IkA if and only if U, E A for each (A-)generic set G containing p. 
For each set p E C let qP be the set of all Herbrand models of YU p. 
Lemma 10. For each sentence A and for all forcing conditions p, p IF- 7 A if and 
only if qP E [A] in X(Y). 
In particular, 0 II-7 7 A if and only if X(Y) E A. 
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LINEAR ORDERINGS 
Now, let r be the theory of linear orderings, formulated in a signature u, which has 
binary relation symbols < , = and countably many constants c, (neM). We shall 
show that 3’(y) is a Boolean valued model of the theory of discrete linear orderings 
with end points. 
In order to see that X(y) k 3xvy( y < x V y = x), it suffices to prove that below 
each forcing condition p there is some condition q forcing this sentence. Now .7Up 
has a finite model, since it contains only finitely many constants. If c, denotes the 
maximal element of this particular linear ordering, then q = p U { Vy( y < c, V y = c,)} 
has the desired property. 
&“(~)1=3xvy(x<y ~y=x)isshowninasimilarway. 
Now, for any c, and p, if plk-jx(c, < x), then 
plk3x(c,<x)~3x(c,<x /Ivy-(c,<y /\y<x)). 
Otherwise there is some p, <p forcing 3x(c, <x), say p, II-c, < c,, i.e. (c, < C,)E 
p, . Again we consider a finite model of .?U p, , where some ck denotes an immediate 
successor of c,. Now q = p, U {V y -J(c,, < y A y < ck)} is a condition I p forcing c, 
to have an immediate successor. 
The cases when y is the theory of Boolean algebras in a language of Boolean 
algebras with countably many new constants and when .T is the theory of ordered 
Abelian groups in the language with + , - , 0, < with finitely many new constants are 
investigated in [4] and [5] respectively. 
A CATEGORY OF BOOLEAN VALUED STRUCTURES 
y(S) can be characterized as an initial object in some category of Boolean valued 
models of 7. Since, in the context of arbitrary universal theories, positive literals are 
not essentially different from negative literals as they are for Horn theories, the 
morphisms in the category to consider will be more similar to isomorphic embeddings 
than to homomorphisms. 
Let 2l = ( aI,, 8, [ 1) and 2I * = (a;, 8, [ 1) be Boolean valued structures of signa- 
ture u with universes U and U* respectively. A A-morphism (C-morphism) from 2l 
into 2l * is a homomorphism from U, into 2l; such that for all quantifier free 
(respectively, existential) formulas A( x,, . . . , x,) of signature 0 and for all 
Ul,..., UnELJ, 
UKA(U ,,..., un) implies 2l*kA(h(u,) ,..., h(u,)). 
If 53 is a class of Boolean valued structures and ZIE!J?, then ‘8 is said to be C in ‘8 if 
every A-morphism of $!I into some structure in !R is a C-morphism. Obviously, for 
classes of 2-valued structures every A-morphism is a C-morphism. 
.%?%kk!(~ ) denotes the class of all Boolean valued models of Z? 
Proposition II. For every universal theory .T and every Boolean valued model % 
of Y with universe U the following conditions are equivalent: 
(1) 8 is C in %Ad(Y). 
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(2) For every quant$er free formula A( x,, . . . , x,) of signature a(U) such 
that Yl t= 3x,. . . jx,,A(x,. . . , x,J, there are u,,, . . . , uln,. . . , uk,, . . . , ukn 
EUsuch that %EA(u ,,,..., u,,)v~~~vA(u, ,,..., ukn). 
PROOF. Obviously, (2) implies (1). On the other hand, if (2) is not satisfied, then 
{-[A(u ,,..., u,,a ,,..., am)]:u ,,..., u,eU} 
has the finite intersection property. Let F be any ultrafilter containing this set, and let 
!?I F be the 2-valued Boolean structure ( ‘?IL,, 2, [ ] F) such that for each atomic sentence 
A with parameters from ‘3, 
[AIF= 1 ifandonlyif [A]EF. 
It can be verified by induction on the form of the axioms of .B that 211F is a model of 
Y. By definition of F, 21L,k 13x,. . .jx,A(x,,. . . , xnt a,, . . . , a,). Thus the 
identity is a A-morphism from 3 into 21, which is not a C-morphism. 0 
This proposition, combined with Herbrand’s theorem, yields immediately the 
following 
Theorem 12. For every consistent universal theory 9 the Boolean valued model 
X”(Y) is C in %&2!(Y)). 
If !I? is a class of Boolean valued structures, then 81~s is said to be initial in ‘8 if 
for each ‘?I* ES there is a unique C-morphism from ‘$?l into 2I *. 
Theorem 13. For every consistent universal theory Y the Boolean valued mode1 
.8 (Y) is initial in K&f( 7 ). 
PROOF. Clearly, the only possible morphism from Y(Y) into a Boolean valued model 
Yl of Y is the one mapping each ground term to its interpretation in ‘?I. This is in fact a 
X-morphism by Theorem 5. 0 
By Theorem 12, X(S) is also initial in the category using A-morphisms. From one 
initial model we can produce many nonisomorphic initial models by extending its 
complete Boolean algebra of values. However, the following theorem shows that initial 
models can be obtained only in this way; more precisely, the partial ordering of the 
value algebra of each initial model contains an isomorphic copy of the corresponding 
partial ordering of X(F). From an example in 141 it can be seen that this is no longer 
true if we consider the complete Boolean algebras instead of the partial orderings. 
The proof of the following theorem makes essential use of the properties of 
C-morphisms. 
Theorem 14. Let Y be a consistent universal theory. For each Boolean valued 
structure 2l = (!?l,, B, [ 1) which is initial in $&Z&/(.7 ), the C-morphism h 
from X”(Y) into 2I can be augmented by a mapping v from C(Y) into the 
universe B of ‘13 such that: 
(1) For each universal formula A( x, , . . , x,,) of signature (J and for all ground 
terms u,, , . . , u, of signature O, v maps the value of A(u,, . . . , u,) in 
310(Y) to the value of A(h(u,), . . . , h(u,)) in U. 
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(2) v is an isomorphic embedding of the partial ordering of 58(Y) into the 
partial ordering of 8. 
(3) For all b,, b2E 1 :2(F) 1 
b,Clb,=Oin8(.T) ifandonlyif v(b,)flv(b,)=Oin~. 
.Y(Y) is up to isomorphy the only initial structure in :%&z’(.T ) with this 
property. 
PROOF. Let 2l = ($!l,, 8, [ 1) be any initial model of Y. Since the possible combina- 
tions of the C-morphisms between Y(3) and ‘8 must be identities, we can assume 
without loss of generality that %[f is the free algebra of variable free terms of signature 
CT generated by the constants and that the identity is a C-morphism from MY to 8 
and conversely. We claim that for all universal sentences A,, A, of CJ 
[A,] 5 [ A21 in Y(Y) ifandonly if [A,] 5 [ A~] in 8. 
Assume that [A,] 5 [A*] in Z?(Y). Let A, = tlr,B,(r,), A, = tlr2B2(rZ). Then 
for all tuples u from U(F) we have [A,] I [B,(u)]; hence [Vr,Bi(r,)-+B,(u)] = 1, 
i.e. [3(7B, VB,(u))] = 1 in .Y(Y). Since the identity is a C-morphism, the same must 
be true in 8, and hence [V r , B,(r ,)I I [&(u)] in U. Since u was an arbitrary tuple of 
ground terms, we obtain [ A ,] I [VT,, B2(r2)] = [ A 2] in %. The converse is proved 
similarly. 
Now let 
v( 6) = sup{ [ A] : A is a universal sentence 
ofsignatureaand[A]rb}in8. 
for each be93(Y). 
We prove first that v satisfies (3). Since for all universal sentences A, B of 
signature u we have @%A fl [%?‘a = [A A B] and this value is preserved under v, (3) is 
satisfied for elements of 2?(Y) of the form [A] where A is a universal sentence. Since 
each element of 8(F) is the supremum of a set of such elements, (3) extends to all 
b&J(T). 
Obviously b, I b, implies v(b,) 5 v(bZ). 
If b, $ b, in B(Y), then let qi, # 0 be such that %%A I b, and ‘@A fl 6, = 0. Then 
in 8, [A] I v(b,) and 
[~]nv(b,)=sup{[~~B]:Bisauniversalsentence 
of signature u and [ B] I 6,). 
If [B] I 6, in B(Y), then [A] and [B] are inconsistent in this Boolean algebra. 
Therefore [ A] fl [B] = 0 in 8 if [B] 5 b,. Hence [Al fl v( b2) = 0. Now we see that 
v( b,) < v( b2). This completes the proof of (2). 
If 2l also satisfies the conditions of the theorem, then there is a map v* from 23 to 
%3(Y) similar to v. We observe that by (1) and (2) for all universal sentences A of 
signature u and for all b ~23 
[~]lbin8 ifandonlyif [~]1u*(b)in8(?). 
Hence v(v*(b)) I b by the definition of v. 
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If v( v*( b)) < b, then there is some b* # 0 such that b* I b and b* fl u( v*( b)) = 0. 
Again by the definition of u, the latter condition implies that b* fl [A] = 0 in % for all 
universal sentences A such that [A] I u*(b) in B(Y). Now let B be a universal 
sentence such that 0 # ?PB I u*( b*) I u*(b) in 9(Y). Then b” n [B] = 0 in 8; 
hence u*( b*) f7 [B] = 0 by (3) and (1)-a contradiction. 
Hence u(u*( b)) = b, and u must be onto, being an isomorphism of the Boolean 
algebras. 0 
We mention that the least Herbrand model of a universal Horn theory can be 
characterized in a similar way, using mappings preserving the validity of existential 
formulas whose quantifier free part is a conjunction of atomic formulas instead of the 
C-morphisms. 
INCOMPLETE SPECIFICATIONS 
By Herbrand’s theorem, from a universal theory ? we can in general obtain incomplete 
specifications of objects whose existence Y proves. Boolean valued structures can be 
used to represent such incompletely specified objects. 
From now on we assume that (T contains a binary relation symbol = and that Y has 
axioms saying that = is a congruence relation. 
Let ‘?I = (a,, 8, [ 1) be a Boolean valued model of 3 with universe U, and let X 
be a partition of unity of 2, i.e., XC 123 1, sup(X)= 1, and b,ftb,=O for all 
b, , b, EX such that b, # b, . For each by ) 23 ) let some cb E U be given and let c be a 
new element, i.e., c$ U. Let !?I,( c) be the extension of 2I, which is freely generated 
by c over 211,. 
We construct a Boolean valued structure Zl* = (‘?I,, % , [ I), putting 
[A(C)] = SUP{ [ A&)] n b: bEX} 
for each atomic formula A(x) of signature u. In particular, we obtain that 
sup{[c=cc,]: beX} = 1. 
(1) 
An easy induction shows that (1) holds in fact for arbitrary formulas of signature u. 
If ZI E/l(C,)V * * - VA(c,) and if X= {b,, . . . , b,} is a partition of 1 such that 
b,~[A(c,)]foralli=l,...,n,then?l*t=~(c). 
In general there are many possibilities for choosing appropriate partitions of 1, e.g. 
the trivial way putting bi = n { - [ A( c;)] : i < j} n [ A( c,)]. We describe a procedure 
that can be used in connection with a backward chaining resolution based deduction 
system. This procedure is a refinement of Green’s procedure (see [6]) for extracting 
possible answers from resolution proofs. 
For each literal L, - L denotes the literal dual to L. If C is a clause or a 
conjunction of literals, then -C denotes the conjunction of literals, or the clause, 
respectively, which is logically equivalent with -C. 
We assume that Y is a consistent theory of universally quantified clauses (i.e. 
disjunctions of literals) and that G(r) is a conjunction of literals such that Y-I= 3 rG(r). 
We consider lists L = [[II,, t ,I, . . . , [II,, t,]], where D, , . . . , 0, are clauses and 
t,, . . . , t, are sequences of terms of the same length as r. For j = 1, . . , m let 
Ej=v(r, {D;:i<j}r\-Dj-G(tj)). 
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Such a list L is said to be a solution of G if all these sentences Ej are consequences of 
7. Note the following simple lemma. 
Lemma 15. 
(a) If L is a solution and S is a substitution, then LS is a solution. 
(b) If L is a solution, then each initial segment of L is a solution. 
(c) If L and L* are solutions, then the list obtained by concatenating L and L* 
is a solution. 
(d) If L is a solution and C is a clause such that L contains several members of 
the form [C, _], and if L” is obtained from L by canceling the last 
occurrence of a [C, _I, then L* is also a solution. 
There is a derivation of the empty clause 0 by resolution from - G (see [l]) using 
the axioms of 7. During the construction of this derivation we keep track of the actual 
instantiation of the variables in r occurring in the goal G and of an additional list L of 
partial solutions. In the beginning L is the empty list. 
We proceed with the formal definition of a proof. 
A proof of G from .? is a finite sequence of clauses and triples [C, u , L] such that 
the last member of the sequence is the empty clause 0 or a triple of the form 
[ 0, u, L] for some sequence u of terms and some list L; 
each member of the sequence is either 
a variant of a clause from 7 or / > 
a variant of the triple [ - G, r , [ I], where r is the sequence of the variables 
occurring in r, or 
a clause or a triple [C, u , L] (where C is a clause, u is a sequence of terms, 
and L is a list), and it is obtained from two of its predecessors in the sequence 
by one of the following rules of inference: 
(A) 
0% 
(C) 
The resolution principle for forming resolvents of clauses.’ 
From the clause C, and the triple [C,, u, L] the triple [C, US, LS] can 
be inferred, where C is a resolvent of C, and C, using the most general 
unifier S. 
From the triple [C, , 11, L , ] and the triple [C, , u 2, Lz] the triple 
[c,u,s,L,s~[[c,s,u,s]]~L~~] 
can be inferred, where C is a resolvent of C, and C, using the most 
general unifier S, and where 0 denotes list concatenation. 
Note that clauses occurring as members of a proof can be obtained only by resolution 
with clauses from Y, not by using the goal clause -G. Hence the last member of a 
proof is the empty clause only in case Y is inconsistent. 
It is easily shown by induction on the length of the proof that for each triple 
[C, u , L] occurring in a proof, L o[ C, u] is a solution of G. Hence any other process 
’ We assume factorization to be included in the resolution principle 
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running in parallel with the construction of the proof can make use of this solution if it 
finds the constructed conditions specific enough for its purposes. 
As an example, let Y be the theory the axioms of which are the universal closures 
of 
(1) x>O Ay>O -+ x*y>O (i.e., -x>O V Ty>O Vx*y>O), 
(2) x<O Aye0 + x*y>O (i.e. -xc0 V ly<O Vx*y>O), 
(3) x < 0 v x > 0, 
(4) 1 > 0, 
(5) - 1 < 0. 
Let the goal G(x) be c* x > 0, where c is a new constant. The following clauses and 
triples form a proof of G: 
(1) [~c*x>O,x,[ 11 from the goal clause, 
(2) axiom (1) from Y, 
(3) [lc > 0 v lx > 0, x, [ ]] from (1) and (2) using (B), 
(4) axiom (4) from 7, 
(5) [‘C>O,l,[ 11 from (3) and (4) using (B), 
(6) I-c<O, - 171 11 similarly, 
(7) axiom (3) from Y, 
(8) [c > 0, - 1, [ 11 from (6) and (7) using (B), 
(9) 10 > - 1, [L7c > 0, 1111 from (5) and (8) using(C). 
We have obtained the solution [[lc > 0, 11, [ 0, - l]], which means that Y implies 
c>O + G(l), 
-c>O --t G(-1). 
Note that a proof can be obtained from a usual proof by resolution, replacing - G(r) 
by the triple [ - G(r), r, [ ]] and replacing other clauses derived using - G by the 
triplets suggested by rules (B) and (C). Hence our refinement of resolution inherits 
completeness. 
By Lemma 15(d), solutions can be simplified by eliminating pairs with the same 
clause. For example, in a linear resolution proof the partial solutions in the triples are 
extended as the proof proceeds. Hence when a predecessor [C,, II,, L ,] of a triple 
[C,, u2, L2] in such a proof is used, each ground clause occurring in a member of L, 
must occur also in L, , and the corresponding pair need not be added to the list attached 
to the resolvent of C, and C,. 
Whenthelast member ofa proofof G(r) is [O,q,[[[D,,t,],.. .,[D,,t,]], then 
for each Boolean valued model 2t of 3 and for each instantiation S with elements of 
the universe of 91 we have that 
[(A {Dj:i<_i}~-Dj)S] I [G(tj)S] for each j I m + 1, 
where Dm+ , = fail and tj+, = n S. The objects representing the incompletely specified 
solutions to the call of G(r) can then be introduced syntactically by Skolem functions as 
. 
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follows: If G has k variables and 8 is a tuple of the variables occurring in the last 
member of the proof, we introduce new function symbols f,, . . , fk whose arity is the 
length of 6. When we add to 2 the axioms 
“d((A {Q: i<j}A-Dj) + f(a) = ii) (j= 1 > . , m+ I), 
where f(a) abbreviates [fl(a), . . . ,fk(a)l, we obtain a conservative extension (Skolem 
extension) of .“i- which can be transformed to clausal form and treated by any of the 
variants of resolution that have been developed for handling equations. v 3 G( f (a)) 
would be a theorem of this extension of 7. 
For the proof discussed above we would introduce a new constant f into the 
signature. .9 would be extended by the axioms 
c>o -+ f= 1, 
-c>o + f= -1. 
In fact G(f) is a consequence of this theory, and in the Boolean valued analog 
least Herbrand model of this extended theory, 
[f= l] = [c>O], [f= -I] = [-c>O] = [c<O], and [G(f)] = 1. 
of the 
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